Differentiated Products 哪位大侠帮忙翻译
In many cases the challenger offers a product that is distinct from the offerings of the patent
holder. Clearly, efficient provision of consumer surplus may well involve preserving both
products under the terms of the settlement. In general, if efficiency requires both products to be
produced, the two parties can use per-unit royalties and fixed-fee payments to move around their
reaction curves and thus induce a Bertrand pricing equilibrium that replicates the optimal
settlement. However, the resulting contract may require per-unit royalties running from the
patent holder to the challenger, which tends to raise its own antitrust concerns. (In this respect,
settling litigation in which each party is asserting patents against the other can provide more
flexibility to the settling parties.) If such payments are prohibited, the primary tool remaining to
influence the Bertrand equilibrium is the royalty rate pay by the challenger to the patent holder.
But the fully optimal settlement may not be obtainable as an induced Bertrand equilibrium. And
an outright merger might well not satisfy the consumer-surplus constraint, unless the merger
would generate its own efficiencies.